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Introduction 
The title of this conference—«Ejercicios de Diferencia»—refers to the twin 
experiences of multiculturalism and marginalization that occur as immigration 
brings increasing cultural diversity and economic segregation. In this paper I will 
examine these processes of diversity and segregation, but I will focus particular 
attention on the «diferencia» between the U.S. and Spain as these processes of 
difference are played out. Specifically, I will investígate the dramatically different 
socio-political construction of guestworker programs in these two countries, and 
the myriad lessons we can learn from this particular difference. 
Foreign worker programs are a central ingredient of Spanish immigration 
policy, just as the Bracero Program for more than twenty years was a primary 
mechanism by which Mexican workers gained legal entry to the United States. 
The oíd Bracero Program and the Spanish foreign worker programs have much 
in common, but there is one área in which they diverge sharply. While the Bra-
cero Program is associated with «slave labor» and «indentured servitude» and was 
vehemently opposed by organized labor and immigrant advocates (who are now 
organizing against attempts to revive the program), in Spain quota worker pro-
grams are considered the most progressive aspect of immigration policy, and it 
is organized labor, not employers, who push for program expansions. 
In order to unravel this paradox, I will trace the history of the Bracero Pro-
gram and briefly sketch recent efforts by growers to revive it; outline the dis-
tinctive immigration systems that provide a backdrop for these programs in the 
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U.S. and in Spain; and, discuss the greater power of Spanish organized labor to 
shape economic relations. In concluding, I will suggest that this case study has 
significant ramifications for cross-cultural research, for public policy, and for pro-
gressive social action. 
The Bracero Program: Then and Now 
On September 29, 1942, five hundred farmworkers from México arrived in 
Stockton, California. Transported by the U.S. government and delivered to Cali-
fornia growers, these Mexican farmworkers were the first installment of a warti-
me emergency program designed to fiU the declared labor shortage in agricultu-
re. Over the next rwenty-two years, five million «braceros» were contracted to 
growers and ranchers in twenty-four states. 
For much of the twentieth century, growers and ranchers in the southwestern 
United States had relied on a plentifiíl supply of undocumented Mexican workers. 
In recognition of the economic benefits of this virtually limidess supply, the Immi-
gration Service often foUowed an informal policy of non-enforcement. The Chief 
Inspector at Tucson, Atizona, for example, reported that he «received orders from 
the District Director at El Paso each harvest to stop deporting illegal Mexican 
labor» (Kirstein, 1977: 90). During World War II, the INS District Director in 
Los Angeles explained that it was his policy not to check farms and ranches for 
undocumented workers during the harvest (Calavite, 1992: 33). In 1949, the Ida-
ho State Employment Service reported, «The United States Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service recognizes the need for farm workers in Idaho and.. .withholds 
its search and deportation until such times as there is not a shortage of farm wor-
kers» (quoted in President's Commission on Migratory Labor, 1951: 76). The 
implicit mess^e from Congress during this period was consistent with this lais-
sez-faire approach. As one observer put it in the early 1950s, Congress was «splen-
didly indifferent» to the rising number of illegal immigrants (Hadley, 1956: 334). 
So lax was enforcement and so pervasive the notion that undocumented Mexican 
immigrants were an integral component of southwestern agriculture that increa-
sed border control was often seen by U.S. policymakers as a Mexican government 
demand (U.S. Congress. House Committee on Agriculture, 1947: 36). 
In the 1950s, INS Commissioner-General Swing launched «Operation Wet-
back,» consisting of the massive deportation of undocumented, and some docu-
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mented, Mexican workers and their families. At first alarmed by the aggressive 
new policies of the INS, growers soon learned that the infusión of Braceros that 
Swing provided them with—in what he called an «exchange» (U.S. Immigration 
and Naturalization Service 1954: 9)—had decided advantages. 
To understand these advantages, it helps to consider the production process 
in agriculture. PfefFer (1980: 25) describes this process, including its seasonai 
nature and the urgency of harvest, and concludes, «The characteristics of the 
labor process in crop production place constraints on the forms of control gro-
wers must exert over workers for profitable completion of the harvest.» While 
undocumented Mexican workers had for years provided growers with the sur-
plus workforce with which to enhance the profitability of agricultural produc-
tion, the contraer system was unusually suited to the exercise of control. 
A cotton fermer told the President's Commission on Migratory Labor (1951), 
«Cotton is a slave crop, nobody is going to pick it that doesn't have to.» Growers 
informed Congress a few years later that only those with no real cholee would 
hoe sugar beets or harvest tomatoes for twelve hours a day in the desert sun (Con-
gressional Record, 1958: 20). While illegal immigrants were desperare, they were 
also mobile. Arthur Watkins (1968: 60), chair of the immigration subcommit-
tee in Congress in the 1950s and himself a Utah grower, told an interviewer, «We 
never picked up any wetbacks if we could avoid it....My son-in-law says 'They 
won't stay with you....They keep moving on, next thing you know, they're gone.'» 
A western grower speaking to Congress in 1961 (U.S. Congress. House Com-
mittee on Agriculture, 1961: 11-13), listed nine advantages of a bracero labor 
forcé, the first of which was that the bracero «is not free to leave an employer to 
seek employment elsewhere.» The Bracero Program thus combined the advan-
tages of a desperare and cheap migrant work forcé with the structure of a govern-
ment program, providing an element of predictability and stability, and—abo-
ve all—control, in what was otherwise an unpredictable production process. 
Bracero contracts theoretically provided for a number of protections, the spe-
cifics of which varied over time. They usually included provisions for braceros 
to be paid the «prevailing wage,» receive a guaranteed amount of work in a given 
period, and have access to housing and emergency medical care. But, it was com-
mon for wages to be set by growers who met at the beginning of the season, deter-
mined the wages they were willing to pay, and then informed state officials of 
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the «prevailing wage.» Employers sometimes simply ignored contract provisions 
they found inconvenient, such as housing and food requirements, and guaran-
teed minimum hours of work (Calavita, 1992). 
Al its heyday in the mid-1950s, the Bracero Program operated in the follo-
wing way. Once the U.S. Department of Labor had certified a need for labor, 
Mexican ofFicials were notified how many workers would be required. Aspiring 
braceros obtained a permit from municipal Mexican oíFicials, and were then sent 
to central recruiting centers where there were sometimes ten applicants for each 
bracero position. After security screening and medical examinations, the selec-
ted braceros were dispatched to border reception centers where they signed con-
tracts with employers' representatives. Workers technically had some freedom of 
cholee in this process, but those who turned down their first ofFer of employ-
ment were often blacklisted by subsequent employers and sent home empty-han-
ded (Anderson, 1963; Galarza, 1964). 
A Border Patrol memo from Yuma, Atizona, told of braceros being «fumi-
gated prior to their departure to the United States...by spraying them by use of 
airplanes, much in the same manner as agricultural fields are sprayed» (U.S. 
Immigration and Naturalization Service. Border Patrol. «Monthly Sector Acti-
vity Report,» Yuma, Atizona, October 1958). Working conditions were often so 
strenuous and the braceros' hands so «badly scratched» and scarred that efforts 
to obtain the necessary fingerprints for FBI clearance frequently failed, with the 
incomplete forms stamped «unclassifiable» and returned to Washington (U.S. 
Immigration and Naturalization Service. Border Patrol. «Monthly Sector Acti-
vity Report,» El Paso, Texas, November 1960). 
Lax enforcement of the contract provisions continued to be the norm, in 
part because INS Commissioner Swing had staked his reputation on reducing 
the numbers of illegal immigrants and replacing them with braceros—an achie-
vement that would have been impossible had employers determined that the bra-
cero contracts were burdensome. By the end of the 1950s, there was mounting 
Some regions and crops were notoriously undesirable. Imperial Valley in California and 
Yuma, Arizona, offerred among the lowest wj^es and the most arduous working conditions, with 
desert temperatures of 110 degrees not uncommon (Anderson, 1963: 28). Other áreas and crops 
were undesirable because of their history of long periods of uncompensated unemployment during 
the contract period. 
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evidence of violations of the terms of bracero contracts and revelations of subs-
tandard housing and working conditions, as well as repeated charges that the 
program depressed wages and contributed to unemployment among U.S. farm-
workers (Anderson, 1963; Galarza, 1956; Department of A^riculture Report, 
cited in CongressionalRecord, 1961: 20257-74; Hadley, 1956: 356). 
The moral position of the program's opponents was buttressed in 1960 by 
the widely acclaimed CBS documentary, «Harvest of Shame,» which graphically 
depicted the poverty and despair of migrant farmworkers in the United States, 
and precipitated a deluge of mail to the televisión network and to Congress. At 
the same time, increasing mechanization of certain crops meant that U.S. gro-
wers were less dependent on the bracero system, which by law prohibited using 
braceros on power-driven machinery. By 1964, the number of braceros was lower 
than at any time since 1951. Facing increasing attacks from organized labor as 
weil as the liberal administration of President Kennedy, and now confined to the 
relatively few crops that had eluded mechanization, the controversial Bracero 
Program was allowed to die in December, 1964. 
So poignant a symbol of exploitation did the Bracero Program become and 
so thorough its discrediting that its poiitical resuscitation has taken several deca-
des. While still controversial in many quarters, some members of Congress have 
recently responded to pleas from western agricultural interests and put a new 
bracero-style program back on the poiitical agenda. 
Spearheaded by the Western Growers' Association, several farmworker bilis 
have been introduced in Congress in the last two years. Each of these bilis would 
expand or replace the current H-2A system of temporary workers for agricultu-
re. The H-2A program requires that employers who wish to import workers for 
seasonal employment advertise first for domestic workers and document a shor-
tage of labor; offer wages that will not «adversely affect» those of local farmwor-
kers; guarantee a certain number of days of work during the contraer period; 
and, provide housing at no cost. Given the ready availability of undocumented 
workers with no such strings attached, it is perhaps not surprising that few gro-
wers apply for workers through the H-2A program. 
^ In the past few years, 15,000-30,000 workers have been imported annually under H-2A, 
constituting only 1-2% of the agricultural workforce. This number is dwarfed by the undocu-
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Most of the ^ricultural workers bilis that have been introduced in Congress 
would allow growers to import workers without providing housing; include no 
guarantees of a minimum number of workdays; allow group piece rates rather 
than guaranteed minimum wages; and, replace the H-2A requirement of adver-
tising for domestic workers with a token «work registry» system. 
This Bracero Program approach has been endorsed by the Governors of Ari-
zona, New México, Texas (under the governorship of now-President Bush), and 
Florida, and virtually all agricultural lobbyists. At first glance, this pressure to re-
establish a massive foreign labor program makes little sense, given the abundan-
ce of undocumented workers available to employers, and high unemployment 
rates among farmworkers. But, as we have seen, braceros were attractive to gro-
wers not as an additional source of labor, but as a particular kind of labor. Spe-
cifically, while illegal immigrants had provided a flexible supply of cheap labor, 
they were also unpredictable, not only because they were subject to deportation 
but also because they were free ^ents. And, while agriculture thrives on the fle-
xibility of undocumented workers, at the same time it seeks structure, predicta-
bility, and above all, control. 
During economic expansions, the inherent tensión between the flexibility 
that undocumented workers provide and their unpredictability is enhanced, as 
the possibility of alternative employment attracts some migrants away from the 
fields. So, it is not a shortage of labor that compels growers to seek braceros in 
this period of expansión, but rather the desire for a workforce that is immune to 
the laws of supply and demand and is precluded from finding more lucrative 
employment elsewhere. 
Not surprisingly, immigrant advocacy groups and labor unions are fiercely 
opposed to this effort. Last year, a letter was sent to every member of the Hou-
se and Senate, signed by 185 organizations, including the AFL-CIO, the UFW, 
and the Farmworkers' Justice Fund. The letter warned, «The guestworkers would 
have few rights and would be vulnerable to exploitation» as a captive labor for-
cé; «The promise of a green card [would] be a cruel hoax for many workers;» 
and, the program would add to unemployment and depressed wages among 
mented (x>pulation that is estimated to make up approximately 50% of the agricultural workfor-
ce (GAO, cited in Lewis, July 7, 2000: A4). 
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domestic farmworkers (Famrworker Justice Fund, September 11, 2000). Per-
meating the press releases and «Action Alerts» of these organizations are refe-
rences to the Bracero Program and the «indentured servitude» such programs 
créate and sanction (Farmworker Justice Fund, 1999). 
The contrast between this reaction of organized labor to a new Bracero Pro-
gram in the U.S. and the response to similar guestworker programs in Spain is 
striking. The following sections give a brief overview of immigrants in the Spa-
nish economy and the political context of temporary worker programs in Spain, 
in order to account for this difFerence. 
Immigration and Quota Workers in Spain: A Descriptive Overview 
Since Franco's death, the Spanish economy has grown by spurts and starts, 
undergoing unprecedented levéis of expansión between 1986 and 1990, when 
over two million new jobs were created, more than in any other European country. 
And, the economy has continued to grow, adding 1.8 million more new jobs sin-
ce 1996. While still lagging behind much of western Europe in terms of real 
wages and standard of living, Spain has also gone far to narrow the gap. Furt-
hermore, Spain's social protections have expanded rapidly and its welfare state is 
now almost comparable to that of other western European democracies. 
The economy in Spain is divided into a technologically advanced primary 
sector that is highly unionized and regulated, and an extensive underground that 
contributes an estimated 14% of Spain's gross domestic product {ElPais, 1998: 
55). Spanish employers becry the rigidity of the formal labor market associated 
with government regulations and collective bargaining. Indeed, they attribute 
the stubborn double-digit unemployment rate to the red tape that limits their 
ability to hire and fire workers and dictates employment conditions {Economist, 
1996; Elgar, 1993; Maxwell and Spiegel, 1994; ElPais, May 27, 1997: 55). 
Since the mid-1980s, Spain has experienced net immigration for the first 
time in modern history. By 1998, over 700,000 foreigners had legal residence in 
Spain, with about half coming from outside the EC, and the vast majority of 
these non-EC immigrants coming from the third-world. The largest source 
country is Morocco, with almost twice as many legal immigrants in Spain as any 
other single country. Most independent sources put the total number of legal 
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and illegal immigrants at about one million (Solé, 1995; Colectivo lOE, 1999; 
ElPais, October 3, 1999: 21). 
Most third-world immigrants in Spain worlc in agriculture, domestic servi-
ce, tourism, construction, or other low-paying and underground sectors of the 
economy (Solé, 1995; Izquierdo, 1996; Gonzalez-7\nleo, 1993; Fumares, 1996). 
This immigrant labor is often lauded for the «flexibility» it provides the economy. 
The former Director-General of Migration has pointed out that a high unem-
ployment rate and the need for immigrant workers are not mutually contradic-
tory, noting that the Spanish labor market «contains certain rigidities» that third-
world labor helps counteract (quoted in Mercado, 1992: 27). 
Indeed, Spanish immigration laws are oriented towards immigration as a labor 
supply, and contain few provisions for permanent legal residency or naturaliza-
tion. «Regularization,» or legalization, programs are implemented every few years, 
with applications reaching several hundred thousand (Borras, 1995; Izquierdo, 
1996). Even those who are legalized, however, enjoy only temporary legal status 
and must generally demónstrate continued formal employment and navigate a 
maze of government bureaucracies to renew their permits. Among the most for-
midable bureaucratic obstacles to renewing one's legal status is the fact that both 
a residence permit and a work permit are required, each of which is provided by 
a different government agency. It is not uncommon that while waiting for one of 
these permits to materialize, the other expires (de Lucas, 1994: 92). Given the 
diíFiculties of retaining legal status, one Spanish immigration scholar has written 
that the policies residt in «institutionalized irregularity» (Santos, 1993: 111). 
One of the few ways to migrate legally to Spain is through small quotas that 
allow workers in temporarily to fiU niches in certain sectors. In 1993, a Coun-
cil of Ministers Agreement in Spain set up a system of national quotas for foreign 
workers in three sectors: agriculture, unskilled construction work, and domestic 
service. From a lew of 6,000 in 1993, the number of such quota workers incre-
ased to 30,000 in 1994, reached 60,000 in 1996, and declined again to 30,000 
in 1999. While the numbers fluctuate from year to year, this quota system for 
temporary workers remains a cornerstone of Spain's immigration policy. 
What is remarkable about the Spanish experience with these guestworker 
programs is that labor unions and immigrant advocacy groups are their greatest 
BRACEROS AND GUESTWORKERS IN THE UNITED STATES AND SPAIN... 2 0 5 
supporters. In marked contrast to the political dynamics in the United States, it 
is labor unions not empioyers who lobby most vociferously for increases in the 
number of foreign workers admitted. In discussions prior to the implementa-
tion of the 1999 immigration law in Spain, the left-leaning unión, CC.OO., 
insisted that the annual quota for foreign workers was «limited» and shouid be 
increased (Escola, 1999: 3). And, the Catalán branch of CC.OO declared in a 
1997 poliq^ paper that the «insufFicient» quotas shonld be vasdy expanded (Paja-
res, 1997:11). 
Recent scholarship (Watts, 1999; Calavita, 1998) has addressed the immi-
grant advocacy role that labor unions play in Spain. As Watts (1999) argües, 
advocacy on behalf of immigrants in part represents enlightened self-interest. 
According to this argument, with immigration an inevitable by-product of glo-
balization and advanced capitalism, labor leaders reason that it is ultimately more 
strategic to advócate on behalf of and organize immigrants than to engage in a 
futile efifort to limit immigration and risk alienating a potential constituency. 
Further, from the point of view of labor it is better to expand the size of the legal 
immigrant population than to enact restrictive policies that will ipsofacto incre-
ase the number of illegal immigrants and confine them to the underground eco-
nomy, out of reach of unión rules and protections (Watts, 1999). 
Last year, the AFL-CIO reversed its position on immigration, replacing its 
long-time restrictionism and hostility to undocumented immigrants with a plat-
form that included support for a new legalization program, the repeal of emplo-
yer sanctions, and a commitment to organizing undocumented workers (Clee-
land, 2000: Al). The position of this major U.S. labor unión is thus in sync with 
its Spanish counterpart on most immigration issues, with the exception ofguest-
workerprograms. In the remainder of my time, I will argüe that it is the distinct 
historical, legal and political contexts that explain this diíFerence. 
The Historical, Legal, and Political Context 
The quota worker system in Spain is technically comparable in a number of 
ways to the oíd Bracero Program and to the proposals currently being conside-
red by Congress. In each case, temporary visas are provided to foreign workers 
to work in a specific industry, to which they are tied for a designated period of 
time. And, in each case legal status is temporary and precarious, as foreign wor-
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kers in Spain are required to secure another work contract at the end of their ini-
tial period of employment in order to retain their legal status. 
While there are relatively minor difFerences in the two contract labor sys-
tems—such as the seasonal nature of the U.S. bracero-style programs and their 
confinement to agriculture—the most dramatic difference is their location in 
the national political debates of each country. To understand the «progressive» 
quality of these programs in Spain, it is important to juxtapose them to the lar-
ger immigration system. Remember that legal immigrant status in Spain is almost 
always contingent. That is, even illegal immigrants who are «regularized» in perio-
dic legalization programs must show annually that they have a formal work con-
tract (a daunting task for these populations largely confined to the underground 
economy), and most legalized immigrants at one time or another fall into ille-
gal status. There is virtually no way to secure permanent legal status or natura-
lization (outside of marriage to a citizen, and in Spain even this route is fraught 
with uncertainty [ElPeriódico, March 19, 1997: 26]). Provisions for permanent 
legal status have been incorporated in recent laws, but to qualify immigrants 
must first piece together múltiple years of continuous formal work contracts and 
work and residency permits. These requirements are so unrealistic given the per-
vasiveness of the underground economy and entail so many bureaucratic hurd-
les that only a small handful of immigrants have achieved this coveted status. 
In this immigration context, the foreign worker program is one of the few 
routes to legality. Further, the temporary and contingent nature of that legality 
does not mark quota workers as a particularly vulnerable sub-set of the immi-
grant population, since this contingency is more or less endemic to the immi-
grant condition in this legal environment. In this context of «institutionalized 
irregularity» (Santos, 1993: 111), the legality—albeit temporary—that the quo-
tas provide is welcomed. Indeed, expanding these quotas is one of the most mea-
ningful and realistic avenues to reform available to immigrant advocates. The 
point is not just that «everything is relative» depending on one's perceptual lens; 
rather, «everything is relative» to the objective reality in which it is inserted. 
If legal immigrant status is more contingent and tenuous in Spain than in 
the U.S., it is also true that the gap between legal and illegal work is more extre-
me. I do not mean by this that the informal economy to which undocumented 
immigrants are confined is any less harsh or precarious in the United States. The 
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gap between legal and illegal work is more pronounced in Europe not because 
the informal economy is worse there, but because the formal economy accords 
more protections than in the U.S., in large part due to the greater power of orga-
nized labor and political parties representing labor. 
While labor parties are less powerfiíl in Spain than in many western Euro-
pean countries, and labor unions are generally weaker, nonetheless relative to the 
United States coUective bargaining and government regulations play a key role 
in the economy. The repercussions of labor's greater power to shape the rules of 
economic engagement in Spain relative to unions in the more classically liberal 
American economy, are two-fold. First, it ups the ante on the importance of legal 
immigrant status, however temporary. While many legal immigrants in Spain 
find themselves locked in the underground economy despite their legal status, 
nonetheless legal status is a pre-requisite to a job in the formal economy over 
which organized labor and government regulations hold substantial sway. And, 
it is only by expanding the number of immigrants in the formal economy, rela-
tive to their numbers in the underground, that organized labor can hope to neu-
tralize the potentially deleterious effect of immigrants on wages and working 
conditions. 
Second, this greater power of organized labor implies a greater ability of labor 
leaders in Spain to particípate in shaping the terms of contracts for quota wor-
kers. Unlike the Bracero Program that generally consisted of closed-door bilate-
ral ^reements between the Mexican and U.S. governments, and that was often 
used as a wedge to undermine already weak farmworker unions ( Calavita, 1992: 
122), in Spain organized labor is more confident of its ability to at least be at the 
table when the terms of these contracts are hammered out.^ 
Finally, history is important here. While Spanish immigrants at one time per-
formed the role of guestworker in northern Europe, large foreign labor systems 
are new in this country that has only in the last two decades become a signifi-
cant immigrant destination. In the United States, instead, the Bracero Program 
' I do not want to exí^erate here. As discussed above, the power of organized labor in Spain 
has always been weak relative to that of its European neighbors. The point here is that Spanish 
labor unions exert a greater influence in political-economic afFairs than do their counterparts in 
the U.S. 
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casts a long shadow. Having gone down in scandal in the early 1960s, it became 
synonymous with slave labor and indentured servitude. So strong is this linge-
ring association of a guestworker program with a captive workforce that when 
then-Senator Pete Wilson (Republican-California) in 1985 introduced the idea 
of a temporary worker program for agriculture as part of the legislation that later 
became IRCA, key democrats in the House vowed to kill any bilí (and they were 
true to their word) with such a «de facto slave labor program» attached to it. 
The Pleasures and Perils of Cross-Cultural research 
This study of the strikingly different socio-political meanings of foreign wor-
ker programs in the U.S. and Spain teaches us both the utility of cross-cultural 
comparative work, and its risks. On one hand, contrasting the progressive mea-
ning of quota worker programs in Spain with their exploitive connotations in 
the U.S. can yield important insights about the integral links between immi-
gration policies and the larger economic, cultural and political systems of which 
they are a part. On the other hand, it is precisely these systemic links with the 
broader socio-cultural environment that make comparative studies of immigra-
tion—or any cross-cultural study for that matter—so fraught with potential for 
misunderstanding. 
Two personal anecdotes could be useful here. The first relates to an expe-
rience I had recently when giving a talk in Naples, Italy, on the economic mar-
ginalization of immigrants and the spatialization of that marginalization in the 
form of residential segregation. The speaker who introduced me had not inqui-
red exacdy what I was going to talk about; he knew only that I was to speak about 
immigration in Naples. As I listened intently to his introduction in Italian, I 
heard him tell the audience that I would be speaking about the problem of the 
«moschea» in Naples. For a moment I panicked, because I had no idea what 
«moschea» meant, and I certainly had no intention of talking about it! I soon rea-
lized that the audience expected me to address the issue of masques in this (at 
least nominally) Catholic society. In short, they were prepared to hear a talk about 
the increasing multiculturalism that has accompanied immigration to Italy. Inde-
ed, I learned on this brief research trip to Italy that the issue of immigration is 
overwhelmingly viewed through the lens of multiculturalism. While some scho-
lars and journalists do address the economic (and related social) issues associa-
ted with immigration, the question of what it means for Italy to become multi-
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cultural, and as they often say in Italy, «multi-ethnic,» is the dominant concern 
and the major topic of debate. To talk of immigration then is almost by defini-
tion to talk about the «moschea.» 
This experience not only had unfortunate repercussions for me personally— 
in that I had to explain why I was not going to talk about what they found most 
interesting—but it reminded me of the danger in cross-cultural work of assu-
ming that we know the meaning of what we are studying. For, what appear to 
be similar phenomena (like immigration) or policies (like guestworker programs) 
may in fact have radically difiFerent social meanings and political realities. Whi-
le this is of course not a new insight—it is in fact a central tenet for ethnograp-
hers and anthropologists—taking it seriously means that those of us who enga-
ge in cross-cultural work of any kind must always be at least part ethnographer. 
Of course, it is not always just social meaning úizt varies across contexts. In 
the case of foreign worker programs, we have seen that the implications of the-
se programs vary according to the power of labor, the economic structure, and 
the immigration systems in which they are inserted. In other words, the larger 
context in efifect determines not just the socio-cultural meaning of these pro-
grams, but their economic and social reality as well. And, this brings me to my 
final point, having to do with the implications of this comparative study for 
policy. 
Policy Implications 
I am often asked by my students whether my critique of immigration res-
trictionism means that I favor an open border, and if not, what policies I would 
recommend. It is a difFicult question to answer. On one hand, I argüe that immi-
gration restrictions are often hypocritical, as immigrants have historically provi-
ded and continué to provide, a large contingent of the cheap labor on which the 
•* I do not mean to imply here that Italy is infacta homogeneous society. An argument can 
be made that Italy has long induded distinct cultural traditions, dramatically difFerent dialects, 
and other marked dissimilarities often related to geographical regions and social class. What is 
important here is that in this debate, it is assumed that Italy has been relatively homogeneous, and 
that immigration is now disrupting that national homogeneiiy (just as a similar argument is often 
made about immigration in Spain). 
210 KlTTY C A L A V I T A 
U.S. economy thrives. And, restrictive immigration policies have the primary 
effect of further marginalizing the (now illegal) immigrant population, enhan-
cing the «flexibility» they provide employers. On the other hand, an open bor-
der not only may be unfeasible, but may jeopardize wages and working condi-
tions in the U.S., as a crowded labor market would further erode labor's already 
weak bargaining position. For progressives interested in poÜcies that enhance 
welfare and empower people, the choices appear to be paltry. 
Perhaps indicative of our unappealing choices, progressives often stumble 
into apparent self-contradictions when discussing immigration policy (and I 
implicate myself here as well). There is, for example, something fundamentally 
self-contradictory about our tolerance of undocumented immigration, or at least 
our unwilÜngness to pubUcally endorse policies aimed at reducing it (sometimes 
our advocacy on behalf of undocumented immigrants is on the grounds that 
they fdl niches abandoned by U.S. workers and thus have no ill effects on labor), 
while at the same time opposing guestworker programs on the grounds that they 
are exploitive of the workers and depress local w^es. (I myself have sometimes 
argued on behalf of undocumented Mexican farmworkers that they are central 
to California agriculture—which would collapse without their labor—while 
opposing a new Bracero Program by pointing out that farmworker unemploy-
ment in many áreas reaches double digits). 
What I want to argüe here is that this apparent inconsistency (which usually 
remains unremarked upon and presumably unnoticed) is the consequence of 
political choices. That is, denouncing undocumented migration would íliel repres-
sive measures antithetical to the kind of empowerment progressives seek. Doo-
med to failure in this global era of coUapsing borders, repressive immigration 
laws have the solé effect of further criminalizing immigrants. The defense of 
unauthorized immigrants, and opposition to laws designed to curb undocu-
mented immigration, is thus a political cholee. So too is the opposition to a new 
Bracero Program which, as history has taught us, would enhance the power of 
agricultural employers while contributing nothing to the lot of immigrants and 
eroding the power of U.S. labor. In other words, unauthorized immigration and 
guestworker programs are being evaluated in their political context and on the 
basis of their political meaning. Seen in this light, the apparent contradiction 
dissolves, to reveal a consistent political reality. But, if the apparent contradic-
tion in which progressives are caught can be understood once we grasp its poli-
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tical meaning, the nagging question remains: What immigration policy should 
we endorse? 
My comparative analysis of Spanish and U.S. foreign worker programs might 
help untangle the immigration poUcy quandary that progressives find themsel-
ves in. For, just as this study highhghts the importance of political meaning in 
evaluating pubHc policies, it also reveáis the important Hnkages between immi-
gration policy and broader economic pohcies and labor relations. Specifically, 
the impact of a guestworker program depends on the larger context—particu-
larly the labor relations and economic reality—in which it is inserted and of 
which it is a part. 
If immigration policy is one piece of a larger set of economic relations, in the 
absence of altering these relations, even well-intentioned immigration policies 
are unlikely to have progressive efFects. Indeed, to the extent that their impact is 
determined by the larger context, immigration policies are likely to reaíFirm the 
relations embedded in that context. It is for this reason that neither extensiva 
undocumented immigration, ñor legal worker programs, ñor even an open bor-
dar, can be considered progressive policies, if taken alone. In fact it is predicta-
ble that, in the absence of any broader changes in economic relations, each of 
these policies would fixrther enhance the exploitive nature of those relations. 
So when asked to describe an acceptable immigration policy, progressives are 
at a loss not because their imaginations are limited, or as is sometimes charged, 
because their analyses are not «policy relevant.» Rather, we are at a loss because 
immigration policy must be considered as the part of a larger set of economic 
policies that it is. To do otherwise—to consider it as a discreet realm of policy-
making—is to forcé the cholee between the lesser of two evils. No doubt this 
explains progressives' peculiar tolerance of undocumented immigration, the mise-
ries and marginalities of which are themselves so well documented. 
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